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Seton Hall Law

Time to Reform Civil Asset Forfeiture
Peter L. Schenke*
I. Introduction
Russell and Patricia own and operate The Motel Caswell, located on 434 Main Street,
Tewksbury, Massachusetts. 1 Mr. Caswell has been a resident of Tewksbury since 1955, when
his father built The Motel Caswell, 2 and he has run it since taking over control from his father in
1984.3 The motel encompasses fifty-six rooms, rents approximately 14,000 rooms per year, has
maintained proper licenses since its opening, and has never received any legal complaints,
nuisance actions, or threats of litigation by neighbors of the motel or the town of Tewksbury. 4 In
its sixth decade of existence, the motel hosts tourists, workers on extended stay, and several
elderly permanent residents.5
On September 29, 2009, the United States filed a complaint for Forfeiture in rem of the
motel property, alleging that the motel rooms were used to “facilitate” a crime. 6 Instead of
charging Mr. or Mrs. Caswell with a crime, the government sued an inanimate object, The Motel
Caswell. The action, initiated via the federal equitable sharing program, discussed in Part III,

*J.D. Candidate, 2016 Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. Economics & Communication , 2013, Univ. of
Delaware. Special thanks to Professor Brian Sheppard for his guidance throughout the writing of this Comment.
1 United States v. 434 Main St., 961 F. Supp. 2d 298, 302 (D. Mass. 2013).
2 Id. at 303. There are no mortgages or encumbrances on the property.
3 Id. The Caswell family has never been involved in any criminal activity at the motel and Mr. Caswell has never
been charged with a crime in his life.
4 Id.
5 George F. Will, When government is the looter, THE W ASH. POST , May 18, 2012,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/when-government-is-thelooter/2012/05/18/gIQAUIKVZU_story.html .
6

Id.; See also 434 Main St., 961 F. Supp. at 2. The complaint alleged property is subject to forfeiture pursuant to 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) because it was “used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the
commission of, a violation of the Controlled Substances Act punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.”
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allowed the town of Tewksbury to team up with the U.S. Department of Justice in order to force
forfeiture of the property and share in the proceeds.7
The government alleged that from 19942008, approximately fifteen motel customers
(representing less than 5/100ths of one percent of the total motel occupancy over a 6,700 day
period) were arrested on drug-dealing charges. 8 During that time, the Caswell’s voluntarily
installed security cameras, photocopied customer’s identifications, recorded their license plates,
cooperated with police, and were never asked by any law enforcement agency to do anything
more before the government filed the forfeiture complaint against their motel. 9 United States
Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) and the Tewksbury Police Department battled in court for
the Motel’s forfeiture for over two years while the Caswell’s maintained their innocence.
Fortunately, the Institute of Justice represented the Caswells, and o n January 24, 2013, more than
2 years after the filing of the initial complaint, United States Magistrate Judge Judith G. Dein
dismissed the forfeiture action against the Caswell’s, ruling that the government engaged in
“gross exaggeration” of the evidence. 10
Through this civil asset forfeiture process, the DEA, along with the Town of Tewksbury,
targeted the Caswell’s $1.5 million unencumbered property, and attempted to destroy the
Caswell’s family-owned business. 11 The sheer lack of evidence connecting the motel to any
drug related crime raised questions and concerns surrounding the incentive behind the attempted
forfeiture of The Caswell Motel. 12 Had they been successful, Tewksbury Police Department

7

George F. Will, supra note 5.
434 Main St., 961 F. Supp. at 311.
9 Id. at 304307. The Court noted, “the evidence was consistent that no one from either law enforcement or the
Town ever took steps to work with Mr. Caswell in an attempt to reduce drug crime at the Motel.”
10 Id. at 316, 329; See also John E. Kramer, Fighting Civil Forfeiture Abuse, Federal & Local Law Enforcement
Agencies Try to Take family Motel from innocent owners, INST IT UTE FOR JUST ICE,
http://www.ij.org/massachusetts-civil-forfeiture-background.
11 Will, supra note 5.
12 Id.
8
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would have received a substantial share of the forfeited motel’s $1.5 million in assets, providing
enormous revenue boost to their annual budget of only $5.5 million. 13 Addressing this concern,
Mr. Caswell believed that if his motel “had a big mortgage, this would not be happening.”14
Pursuant to the Department of Justice’s Equitable Sharing program 15 , the Tewksbury
Police Department teamed up with the DEA in order to federalize the investigation, thereby
removing the forfeiture from state law jurisdiction. 16 Proceeding under federal forfeiture law via
equitable sharing instead Massachusetts’ state forfeiture law, the Tewksbury Police Department
were eligible to receive up to 80% of the forfeiture proceeds back from the Department of
Justice. 17 As discussed in more detail in Part III, that is because the practice of federal equitable
sharing provides state and local law enforcement agencies with the opportunity to circumvent
state law, in order to reap the distribution and evidentiary standard benefits of the federal
forfeiture laws.18
Civil forfeiture actions, the type brought against The Motel Caswell, refer to nonconviction based forfeiture proceedings. 19 Instead of criminally prosecuting the owner of the
property, the government files the action in rem against the property itself. 20 Because the
property is the defendant in these cases, it is not afforded to the same constitutional safeguards
that are present in criminal matters. 21 The nonexistence of any requirement that the property
owner has been arrested or convicted of a crime in order for the property to be subject to
13

Id.
Id.
15 UNIT ED ST ATES DEPARTMENT OF JUST ICE, GUIDE T O EQUIT ABLE SHARING FOR ST ATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT A GENCIES, (2009) [Hereinafter DOJ Equitable Sharing Guide]; See, Infra Part III.
16 Kramer, supra note 10.
17 Id.
18 See, Infra Part III.
19 ST EFAN D. CASSELLA, CIVIL A SSET RECOVERY: THE A MERICAN EXPERIENCE, Working Title, 1–19 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2013) available at http://works.bepress.com/stefan_cassella/30 (Chapter of a book submitted for
publication discussing non-conviction based asset forfeiture).
20 Id. at 4.
21 Id. Constitutional safeguards include the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.
14
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forfeiture, 22 combined with the fact that federal civil forfeiture laws carry a significant ly lower
burden of proof as compared to their criminal counterparts 23 , has brought about daunting
criticism of the current state of civil forfeiture laws.24
Generally, asset forfeiture actions commence when law enforcement personnel determine
that there is probable cause to believe that illegal activity has occurred. 25 Once probable cause
has been established, the law enforcement agent is authorized under federal law to seize any
applicable property or cash from the owner under federal law. 26 If the property owner timely
contests the seizure, and if the seizure involves real property, or property with a value over
$500,000.00, than the government is required to establishby a preponderance of the
evidencethe property’s forfeitability at a judicial proceeding. 27 Thus, in order to for the
government to succeed in forfeiting an individuals property, they are required to provethat is
more probable than not, i.e. by a preponderance of the evidence,that the property is subject to
forfeiture, or under the facilitating property theory, that there was a substantial connection
between the property and offense. 28 As set forth in more detail in Part II, federal asset forfeiture
laws authorize the takings of contraband, proceeds, and property used to commit, facilitate or
involved in the commission of a criminal offense. 29 This process results in very unusual case

22

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 98183 (2015).
DEE EDGEWORT H, A SSET FORFEIT URE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN ST ATE AND FEDERAL COURT S 8 (3rd ed.
2014)
24 See, e.g., infra Part III. Criticism includes the inadequate standard of proof, law enforcement’s conflict of interest,
(as they are able to retain and use the forfeited assets), and states’ inability to enforce their mandated forfeiture
legislation due to the equitable sharing program.
25 Jefferson Holcomb et al., Civil Asset Forfeiture, Equitable Sharing, and Policing for Profit in the United States,
39 J. CRIM. JUST . 273, 274 (2011).
26 Id.
27 Edgeworth, supra note 23, at 3536.
28 See, 18 U.S.C. § 983 (c)(13).
29 See, Infra Part II.
23
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names, i.e., United States v. $557,993.89, More or Less, in U.S. Funds. 30 Once the forfeiture
proceeds have been collected, federal law permits the distribution of proceeds directly to the law
enforcement agencies, where funds can be used for law enforcement purposes only.31
While there are inherent concerns about the potential for abuse, there are several overarching policy justifications and reasons that the forfeiture laws were implemented. 32 Aiming to
combat illegal drug trafficking, asset forfeiture removes the tools of the crime from circulation so
they cannot be used again, serves as a way to restore property to victims of crime, takes the profit
out of the crime, and constitutes a form of punishment. 33 Thus, civil asset forfeiture permits the
government to seize the property because it has been used in violation of the law and to recover
“the fruits of the illegal conduct”.34
Amidst concern over the increasing use of civil asset forfeiture, Congress has only
reformed the law of forfeiture one time, with the passage of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform
Act (“CAFRA”) of 2000. 35 CAFRA shifted the burden of proof to the government and created
the uniform innocent owners exemption. 36 Unfortunately the CAFRA failed to implement
adequate standards of proof and address the conflict of interest for law enforcement agencies,
thereby leaving the most prominent abuses of forfeiture law untouched. 37 The conflict of interest
surrounding law enforcement agencies arises from their authorization to retain all net forfeiture

30

287 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Ninety-Three (93) Firearms, 330 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 2003);
United States v. One-Sixth Share, 326 F.3d 36, (1st Cir. 2003).
31 Holcomb, supra note 25, at 274.
32 Stefan D. Cassella, Overview of Asset Forfeiture Law in the United States, 173 SOUT H A FRICAN J. CRIM. JUST .
347, 34748 (2004) [hereinafter Overview of Asset Forfeiture Law].
33 Id.
34 Id. (citing United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 284 (1996)).
35 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106185, 114 Stat. 202. See also infra Part II.
36 David Pimentel, Forfeitures Revisited: Bringing Principle to Practice in Federal Court , 13 NEV. L.J. 1, 31 (2012).
37 See infra Part III.
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proceeds, brought about by the creation of the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Fund in
1984.38
On July 23, 2014, Senator Rand Paul introduced the Fifth Amendment Integrity
Restoration Act (“FAIR Act”), seeking to “protect the rights of citizens and restore the Fifth
Amendment’s role in seizing property without due process of law.” 39 The FAIR Act would raise
the government’s burden of proof to clear and convincing evidence, require state and local law
enforcement agencies to abide by state law when forfeiting seized property (eliminating federal
equitable sharing), and redirect the forfeiture assets from the Attorney General’s Asset Forfeiture
Fund to the U.S. Treasury’s General Fund. 40 As set forth in Part IV, the time has come for
Congress to reform federal asset forfeiture laws and stre ngthen individual’s property rights. Part
II of this Comment will discuss the history of federal civil forfeiture laws, the first reform effort
(CAFRA), and what constitutes forfeitable property. Part III of this comment will discuss the
continuing problems and concerns with the current civil forfeiture system that CAFRA failed to
address. Part IV of this comment argues why enacting the FAIR Act is a crucial step toward
curbing the abuses associated with civil asset forfeiture, and Part V will conclude.

II. Overview and History of Forfeiture Laws and the Civil Asset Forfeiture Act of 2000
A. Methods and Categories of Asset Forfeiture
Federal asset forfeiture laws permit the takings of contraband, proceeds, and property
used to commit, facilitate or involved in the commission of a criminal offense. 41 The first theory

38 See, Infra Part II B.
39

Press Release, Rand Paul, Sen. Paul Introduces the FAIR Act (Jul. 24, 2014),

http://www.paul.senate.gov/?id=1204&p=press_release [hereinafter Sen. Paul Press Release].
40

The Fifth Amendment Integrity Restoration Act, S. 2644, 113th Congress (201314); Sen. Paul Press Release,
supra note 39.
41 Edgeworth, supra note 23, at 11.
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of forfeiture, contraband per se, refers to property that is illegal to possess because the legislature
has determined that it does not have a lawful purpose. 42 By reason of its illegality, no individual
can have a legal right to such property, and therefore the affirmative defense of an innocent
owner exemption is not available in contraband forfeitures. 43 The second theory of forfeiture,
proceeds forfeitures, targets property of any kind obtained directly, or indirectly, as a result of
the illegal activity, 44 including and includes all interest, dividend, income, or other property
derived from the criminal transaction. 45 When the government uses the proceeds theory of
forfeiture, it bears the burden to establish a connection, through actual evidence, between the
property seized and the illegal activity by a preponderance of the evidence in civil judicial
forfeitures. 46 The last theory of forfeiture, and the most contentious, is fac ilitation forfeiture.
Facilitating property encompasses any property “that makes the prohibited conduct less difficult
or more or less free from obstruction or hindrance.”47
There are three methods of federal asset forfeiture: (1) administrative; (2) civil in rem;
and (3) criminal. 48 In administrative forfeitures, property is forfeited without formal court
proceedings or judicial intervention.

49

In certain statutorily authorized situations,

50

administrative forfeiture permits law enforcement agents to seize property, generally pursuant to
a judicial warrant based on probable cause to believe that the property is subject to forfeiture.51
When a law enforcement agent utilizes administrative forfeiture, he must give notice to all

42

Id.
Id.; see United States v. 144,774 Pounds of Blue King Crab, 410 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2005).
44 18 U.S.C. § 981 (a)(2)(A).
45 Edgeworth, supra note 23, at 12; See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(c).
46 See 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1).
47 Edgeworth, supra note 23, at 12 (citing United States v. Shifferli, 895 F. 2d 987, 990 (4th Cir. 1990)).
48 Edgeworth, supra note 23, at 2.
49 Id. at 19. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 983.
50 Property may only be forfeited administratively if it is currency or has a value under $500,000. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 981, 983; 19 U.S.C. § 16021621.
51 See Overview of Asset Forfeiture Law, supra note 32, at 13; see, e.g., § 981 (b).
43
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potential claimants that the property has been seized based on probable cause, and is subject to
forfeiture, and that unless someone files a claim opposing the administrative forfeiture action, the
property will be declared “forfeited” to the government. 52 If somebody files a claim opposing
the forfeiture in a timely manner, however, then the proceeding is converted into a judicial civil
forfeiture action. 53 This method of forfeiture is particularly desirable to law enforcement agents
because it conserves judicial resources, yields faster resolution of uncontested matters, and
permits the seizing agency to obtain possession of the property and to retain control throughout
the entirety of the action. 54 But, administrative forfeiture can only be used for currency (any
amount), personal property valued at $500,000 or less (including cars and guns), and hauling
conveyances of unlimited value;55 thus, is not applicable in any forfeiture of real property.
Civil forfeiture is an in rem judicial action against the property and permits law
enforcement to immediately seize and retain possession of property pending the resolution of the
forfeiture proceedings. 56

After the government files a complaint alleging the property’s

forfeitability, the property owners are required to file claims to the property as well as an answer
to the complaint. 57 At the judicial proceeding, the government is required to establishby a
preponderance of the evidence (a standard far below the criminal forfeiture “reasonable doubt”
standard)that the property was derived from or was used to commit a crime. 58 If the
government is able to meet its burden of proof, the claimant has the opportunity, and burden of

52

Edgeworth, supra note 23, at 3. Sixty day deadline from date of seizure to send notice to interested parties (§
983(a)(1)(A)(i)), or ninety days if it is an adoptive forfeiture (§ 983(a)(1)(A)(V)).
53 Id. Claimant has thirty days after the date of mailing of the notice letter to file a claim § 983 (a)(2)(B). The
government then has ninety days to initiate judicial forfeiture action after claim is filed § 983(a)(3)(A).
54 Edgeworth, supra note 23, at 19.
55 DOJ Equitable Sharing Guide, supra note 15, at 31.
56 Edgeworth, supra note 23, at 8. Seizure is authorized through either the issuance of an arrest warrant in rem,
seizure warrant, or warrantless seizures based on probable cause. Id.
57 Overview of Asset Forfeiture Law, supra note 32, at 358.
58 18 U.S.C. § 983(c); see also Overview of Asset Forfeiture Law, supra note 32, at 12.
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proof, to contest the forfeiture as an innocent owner. 59 The innocent owner defense is designed
to protect property owners who were unaware that their property was used for illegal purposes,
or who took all reasonable steps under the circumstances to stop such activities. 60
The last method of forfeiture is criminal forfeiture.

Criminal forfeiture is filed in

personam and follows a criminal conviction of the property owner. 61 This method of forfeiture
is vastly different then the others due to the requirement of the property owner’s prior conviction
and the heightening of the government’s burden of proof to “beyond a reasonable doubt.”62
Because defendants in these actions are afforded Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment
protections, as well as the higher burden of proof, criminal forfeitures will not be analyzed
throughout this Comment.63
B. The Inception of Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws
United States federal civil asset forfeiture law came to fruition in 1970 during the
beginning stages of the War on Drugs with the enactment of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970. 64 Under the Act, the federal government was permitted to
seize and forfeit property used in connection with illegal drug trade. 65 The scope of forfeitable
property under this Act was very restricted, deeming all controlled substances, all raw materials,
and equipment used or intended for use in manufacturing illegal drugs forfeitable. 66 This law,
however, was unable to gain traction within law enforcement. For example, in the nine years
59

See, e.g., § 983(d).
Id. The burden is on the claimant to prove their innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. §
983(d).
61 Pimentel, supra note 36, at 6.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 7.
64 REP . HENRY HYDE , FORFEIT ING OUR PROPERTY RIGHT S 24 (1995); see 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988 & Supp. IV
1992).
65 Marian Williams, Civil Asset Forfeiture: Where Does the Money Go?, 27 GA. ST . U. CRIM. JUST . REV. 321, 323
(2002).
66 Eric L. Jensen & Jurg Gerber, The Civil Forfeiture of Assets and the War on Drugs: Expanding Criminal
Sanctions While Reducing Due Process Protections, 42 Crime & Delinquency 421, 422 (1996).
60
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following its enactment, less than thirty million dollars in assets had been forfeited. 67 For
comparison, almost the same amount was forfeited in 1985 alone. 68
The Act was amended in 1978, adding subsection (a)(6) to § 881 and permitting the
forfeiture of money and other things of value furnished, or intended to be furnished, in exchange
for a controlled substance and all proceeds traceable to such transaction. 69 As Rep. Henry Hyde
proclaimed, this was the start to an “important progression of events here that must be
recognized.”70 The progression of events that Rep. Hyde referenced involved the vast expansion
of the scope of federal forfeiture laws. This continued pattern of drug forfeiture law expansion
did not stop until 1992.71
The most significant, and controversial, expansion in federal civil forfeiture occurred in
1984. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act amended § 881 to include the forfeiture of all real
property used, or intended to be used, to commit or to facilitate the commission of a drug
crime, 72 thus authorizing the seizure of any ‘facilitating’ real property. 73 Furthermore, the 1984
bill included two other highly controversial provisions.

The first provision authorized the

creation of the new Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Fund, in which the Attorney General
deposits all net forfeiture proceeds for use by the DOJ or other federal agencies, 74 instead of the
General Fund of the Treasury where the proceeds were deposited prior to the 1984 amendment.75
As discussed in Part III, below, the switch from the U.S. Treasury General Fund to the Justice

67

Id. at 424 (referencing William Nelson, Should the Ranch Go Free Because the Constable Blundered? Gaining
Compliance with Search and Seizure Standards in the Age of Asset Forfeiture , 80 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1315 (1992).
68 Id.
69 Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978 (found at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988)); see Hyde, supra note 64, at 25.
70 Hyde, supra note 64, at 25.
71 Id.
72 Id.; See, e.g., The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (found at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988)).
73 Id.
74 LEONARD LEVY, A LICENSE T O ST EAL : THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 115 (1996).
75 Id.

11

Department’s Asset Forfeiture Fund created a profit incentive and a conflict of interest via the
opportunity given to law enforcement agencies to keep the assets they seize. 76
The second controversial provision in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act established
the Department of Justice equitable sharing program. 77 Utilizing the practice of equitable
sharing, state and local law enforcement agencies have the ability to request that a federal agency
“federalize” or “adopt” the forfeiture, and in return receive up to eighty percent of the
forfeiture’s total net value.78
The Act was later amended in the 1986 Anti- Drug Abuse Act, which authorized civil
forfeitures of proceeds of money- laundering activity. 79 Congress did not stop there. In 1990, the
Act was amended to include proceeds from counterfeiting and other financial offenses. 80 Two
years later, Congress expanded the scope of forfeiture once again, this time adding proceeds
traceable to motor vehicle theft and other categories. 81 The final expansion of federal forfeiture
law occurred in 1992. 82 That amendment eliminated the requirement of identifying the specific
property that is subject for forfeiture, and allowed the government to seize “any identical
property found in the same place or the same account as the property involved in the offense.”83
After the enactment of the 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act, the use of forfeitures
skyrocketed. 84 In 1985, asset forfeiture receipts totaled $27.2 million. 85 In the 1992 fiscal year,

Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda , 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
35, 40 (1998).
77 Katherine Baicker & Mireille Jacobson, Finders Keepers: Forfeiture Laws, policing incentives, and loca l budgets,
91 J. PUB. ECON. 2113, 2116 (2007).
78 Id.
79 Hyde, supra note 64, at 25. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
80 Id. (expressing concern over the expansion of forfeiture laws); 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 1992);
81 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(F) (Supp. IV 1992).
82 Hyde, supra note 64, at 25; see 18 U.S.C. § 984(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1992)
83 Hyde, supra note 64, at 25 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 984(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1992)).
84 Jensen & Gerber, supra note 66, at 424.
85 Id. (citing Nelson, supra note 67, at 1324).
76
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asset forfeiture receipts ballooned up to $874.9 million. 86 In the short seven- year time frame
from 19851992, asset forfeitures multiplied almost fortyfold. 87 The colossal increase of $847.7
million in total forfeiture receipts from 1985-1992, compared with the meager near $30 million
increase from 1970-197988 , provides an illustration of the dramatic expansion and subsequent
utilization of federal forfeiture laws. Unfortunately, as the government expanded the scope of
federal forfeiture law, it directly affected and reduced individual’s fundamental property rights. 89
C. The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000.
Amongst concern over the increasing abuse of forfeiture laws, the Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act of 2000 (“CAFRA”) was enacted and signed into law by President Clinton on April
25, 2000.90 CAFRA aimed to bolster individual’s rights in federal civil forfeiture proceedings
and minimize the procedural controversies surround ing civil forfeiture. 91 Scholars regarded its
enactment as the first significant victory for civil asset forfeiture’s critics.

92

CAFRA

implemented several changes to federal civil asset forfeiture law; the shift of the burden of proof
in forfeiture proceedings from the property owner to the government, the creation a uniform
innocent owner defense, the elimination of the cost bond requirement, the addition of notice and
filing time restrictions, and the authorization of reasonable attorney’s fees for prevailing property
owners in forfeiture proceedings.93

86

Jensen & Gerber, supra note 66, at 424.
Id.
88 Id.
89 See Hyde, supra note 64.
90 Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act
of 2000 (CAFRA), 195 A.L.R. FED. 349; see Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106185, 114
Stat. 202.
91 Id.
92 John L. Worrall, Addicted to the drug war- The role of civil asset forfeiture as a budgetary necessity in
contemporary law enforcement, 29 J. OF CRIM. JUST . 171, 175 (2001); see also Williams, supra note 65, at 322.
93 The Fifth Amendment Integrity Restoration Act, S. 2644, 113th Congress (201314).
87
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The first, and most crucial, reform of CAFRA was the shifting of the burden of proof in
civil forfeiture proceedings to the Government. 94 Prior to CAFRA, the government was only
required to show probable cause of the property’s forfeitability. 95 Once probable cause was
shown, the burden of proof shifted to the property owner to establish that the property was not
subject to forfeiture. 96 CAFRA addressed this procedural dilemma and shifted the burden of
proof to the Government, requiring it to prove the property’s forfeitability by a preponderance of
the evidence. 97 But, in order to trigger the Government’s burden of proof, the property owner
must timely contest the forfeiture. 98 CAFRA also established a uniform defense for innocent
owners, providing protection to both property interests existent at the time of the illegal conduct,
as well as to bona fide purchasers who acquired the property interest after illegal conduct has
occurred. 99 As discussed below, one recurring problem, however, is that a majority of civil
forfeitures proceed uncontested and are not challenged in judicial proceedings.100
The reform act also implemented new procedural requirements. 101 CAFRA requires that
the government provide notice to owners that their property has been subject to forfeiture within
sixty days of the seizure. 102 Once the government has filed the forfeiture complaint, property
owners who wish to contest and challenge the seizure are required to file such claim no later 30
days after the date of service of the government’s complaint. 103 In addition, CAFRA enumerated

94

Worrall, supra note 92, at 175.
Pimentel, supra note 36, at 20.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 21; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)
98 Id.
99 See Van Arsdale, supra note 90; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (noting the claimant has the burden of proving his or
her innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.)
100 See infra Part III.
101 Barclay Thomas Johnson, Restoring Civility- the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Baby Steps Towards
a More Civilized Civil Forfeiture System, 35 IND. L. REV. 1045, 1070 (2002).
102 18 U.S.C. § 983(a). If the government fails to notify the owners within the sixty days, the forfeiture action
terminates and the property must be returned. Time period for notice is extended to ninety days for seizures via the
federal equitable sharing program. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(iv).
103 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A).
95
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a specific set of rules for real property forfeitures. 104 Emphasizing the importance and necessity
of real property to individuals, CAFRA requires both notice to the owner and a judicial
proceeding before forfeiture of such property. 105
Furthermore, CAFRA provided more protection to individual property owners after the
initial seizure has taken place via the creation of the hardship provision, the right to an
appointment of counsel, and the elimination of the cost bond requirement. 106 Under the hardship
provision, an owner has the ability to keep property subject to forfeiture pending the resolution
of the forfeiture proceedings if he or she is able to show substantial hardship without it. 107 In
making a final determination, the court will balance the hardship on the owner against “the risk
that the property will be destroyed, damaged, lost, concealed, or transferred if it is returned
during the pendency of the proceedings.”108 If the property owner/claimant is indigent, CAFRA
authorizes the appointment of counsel if the property at issue is the claimant’s primary
residence. 109 Prior to CAFRA, the law required a claimant to post a cost bond, the lesser of
either $5,000 or ten percent of the seized property’s value, 110 in order to contest the forfeiture.111
Noting that the cost bond requirement jeopardized indigent claimants’ ability to contest
forfeitures, 112 the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary believed that it served as an
unnecessary and unconstitutional deterrent, and thus eliminated the cost bond entirely. 113 Lastly,
CAFRA attempted to clarify the necessary relationship between forfeitable property and the
104

Johnson, supra note 101, at 1071.
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106185, § 7, 114 Stat. 202.
106 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 983; Pimentel, supra note 36, at 2126.
107 Pimentel, supra note 36, at 25; 18 U.S.C. § 983(f)(7).
108 18 U.S.C. § 983(f)(7).
109 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(2). Subsection (b)(1) also provides counsel if the indigent claimant is already represented by
court-appointed counsel in a related criminal proceeding.
110 19 U.S.C. § 1608 (1999).
111 Brant C. Hadaway, Executive Privateers: A Discussion on Why the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act Will Not
Significantly Reform the Practice of Forfeiture, 55 U. M IAMI . L. REV. 81, 110 (2000).
112 H.R. Rep. No. 105-358, pt. 1, at 34 (October, 30, 1997).
113 Id.
105
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underlying offense triggering the seizure by requiring the government to prove that there is a
“substantial connection” between the facilitating property and the offense. 114

Part III: CAFRA’s Failure to Resolve Federal Civil Forfeiture Concern: Continuing Problems
Despite serving as the first vital step in the commencement of civil asset forfeiture
reform, scholars have widely criticized the Act’s failure to address the major concerns and
constitutional inequities present in our current system. 115

In particular, CAFRA fails to

implement the appropriate burdens and standards of proof, to resolve the misuse in the practice
of federal equitable sharing, and to rectify law enforcement’s conflict of interest surrounding the
ever-present profit incentive.
A. Inadequate Standards of Proof
The first shortcoming of the CAFRA was its failure to appropriately balance the burdens
of proof between the government and property owners.

In initially determining that the

appropriate standard of proof was the clear and convincing evidence standard, the House
Committee on the Judiciary noted, “[t]he general civil standard of proofpreponderance of the
evidenceis too low a standard to assign to the government in this type of case. A higher
standard of proof is needed that recognizes that in reality the government is alleging that a crime
has taken place.”116 Unfortunately, the House bill’s clear and convincing evidence standard was
met with opposition in the Senate, resulting in the adoption of a preponderance of the evidence
standard of proof. 117 Rep. Henry Hyde, the sponsor of the House CAFRA bill, expressed
concern about the inverse, and very troubling, correlation between the vast scope of forfeiture
114
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laws and individual’s property rights as follows: “All this recent statutory expansion means not
only a dramatic increase in the number of crimes covered by civil asset forfeiture but also a
significant lessening of any relationship between an owner’s guilty act or offense, if any, and the
property that is subjected to forfeiture.”118 Interestingly, and non-coincidently, the clear and
convincing evidence standard has been at the forefront of civil forfeiture debate since the very
beginning of the reform efforts. 119 The current inadequacy of the burdens of proof endangers the
strength and practical application of the innocent owner’s defense and fails to rectify the problem
of uncontested forfeitures.
First, the present allocation of the burdens of proof in civil forfeiture proceedings restricts
the strength of the innocent owner’s defense. 120 CAFRA included a provision that created a
uniform innocent owner’s defense, placing the burden on the property owner to prove his or her
innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. 121 At first glance it may appear as though
innocent owners and the government stand on equal ground with the same preponderance of the
evidence standard of proof. 122 That appearance, however, is nothing more than a façade. In
reality, innocent owners face an additional hurdle that the government does not, the requirement
of proving a negative, i.e., that they are not guilty. 123 In order to establish their innocence,
property owners must rebut and negate the government’s allegations, 124 and prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he or she “did not know of the conduct giving rise to
118
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forfeiture” or “upon learning of the conduct… did all that reasonably could be expected under
the circumstances to terminate such use of the property”. 125 Thus, even though both parties have
the same standard of proof, the property owners face an additional burden of proof in negating
the government’s allegations, as well as proving their innocence through § 983(d) as set forth
above. To make matters worse, the federal courts have not uniformly assessed or determined
what constitutes knowledge and consent on the property owner’s behalf, 126 with some district
courts using an objective standard of review 127 while other circuit court’s employing a subjective
standard. 128

The government’s preponderance of the evidence standard of proof fails to

recognize the additional burden of proof that property owners must bear in order to establish
their innocence, and provides the government with a favorable advantage in proving the
property’s forfeitability.
Furthermore, property owners asserting the innocent owner’s defense carry the burden to
establish their own innocence, an arrangement of innocence that is completely at odds with
notion of “innocent until proven guilty” that applies in criminal cases. 129 Instead of benefitting
from the criminal principle of “innocent until guilty”, property owners must proveby a
preponderance of the evidencethat their property was not guilty in order to exempt the property
from forfeiture. 130 If the government proceeds under the facilitating property theory, they simply
have to establish that there was a “substantial connection between the property and the
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offense.”131 But, regardless of which theory of forfeiture the government asserts, individuals
must prove their innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. 132 This difference in the
allocation of the burdens jeopardizes potentially truly innocent property owners, as there is no
way that the government’s facilitating property-substantial connection standard equates with the
innocent owner’s preponderance of the evidence standard, and bearing the burden in proving his
or her innocence.
The imbalance among the standards of proof is evidenced in the overwhelming
percentage of uncontested forfeitures. 133 Nearly eighty percent of all forfeitures in federal court
go uncontested. 134 Despite CAFRA’s implementation of the preponderance of the evidence
standard of proof on the government, it has been reported that the percentage of uncontested
forfeitures has remained reasonably steady. 135 This realization should raise concern, as forfeiture
deprives individuals their right to property, signaling fundamental due process concerns. The
Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment provides that, “Nor Shall any person… be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law…”136 Commentators have hypothesized
that a primary reason of the uncontested forfeitures is the inability to afford legal fees in order to
contest the forfeiture, estimating that legal fees in a federal case can easily amount to $25,000.137
An article published in the Philadelphia City Paper found that in 2010, the Philadelphia District
Attorney filed upwards of 8,000 civil forfeiture cases for the seizure of currency alone, averaging
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a total of $550 per case. 138 That is quite a hefty expense to bear for the average individual,
especially considering the fact that the individual was never charged with or convicted of a
crime.

Despite the elimination of the cost bond requirement, property owners continue to face

financial difficulties before even appearing in court to contest the forfeiture.

Raising the

standard of proof to clear and convincing evidence would combat this problem by ensuring that
the government has the proper investigatory and evidentiary foundation before proceeding with
seizure and forfeiture. In theory, a higher standard of proof would deter the government from
targeting property based on flimsy or weak evidence, and instead proceed only against property
that it is substantially certain to be subjected to forfeiture.

B. Continuing Profit Incentive & Misuse of Equitable Sharing
The second shortcoming of CAFRA was its failure to rectify the abuse associated with
the practice of federal equitable sharing and eliminate law enforcement personnel’s profit
incentive stemming from the distribution of forfeiture proceeds through the Department of
Justice’s Asset Forfeiture Fund.
The Comprehensive Control Act of 1984 created the practice known as equitable
sharing, 139 and includes two separate methods: joint investigations and adoptive forfeitures.140
Joint investigations occur when state or local law enforcement agencies partner with a federal
agency to investigate and enforce federal criminal law. 141 The percentage of forfeiture funds that
state or local agencies receive via joint investigations is determined by their role, direct
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participation, and effort in the seizure. 142 Adoptive forfeitures occur when a state or local law
enforcement agency seizes property, requests a federal agency to adopt it, and transfers the
seizure to such agency for federal forfeiture proceedings. 143 The state or local law enforcement
agency then receives back up to eighty percent of the total net assets obtained through the
forfeiture, 144 with the requirement that it must use the funds for law enforcement purposes
only. 145 When adoptive forfeitures occur, the state’s law is disregarded and the seizure is subject
exclusively to federal jurisdiction.146
There are two main reasons why state and local law enforcement a gencies choose
adoptive forfeitures instead of proceeding under their own state’s laws. Unlike federal law, the
forfeiture laws of the individual states vary in strength and distribution jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. 147 First and most prominent, federalizing forfeitures gives state or local agencies the
ability to receive back more forfeiture funds, exclusively for law enforcement purposes, than
would otherwise have been received under state law. 148 Second, local and state law enforcement
agencies may decide to federalize a forfeiture because the federal law provides a more relaxed,
government- friendly burden of proof than the laws of a state. 149 Thus, not only is it more
profitable for certain agencies to proceed federally, it may also be easier by requiring a lower
threshold level of evidence.
At the most basic level, adoptive forfeitures through the practice of equitable sharing
provide state and local agencies with a powerful toolbox, in which they are able to pick and
142
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choose which jurisdiction provides the most favorable burdens and benefits of forfeiture. 150
Scholars Jefferson Holcomb, Tomislav Kovandzic, a nd Mirian Williams analyzed the
relationship between the forfeiture distribution laws of states, standards of proof, and the amount
of equitable sharing proceeds allocated to them in an empirical study of 563 municipal and
sheriff’s offices that participated in the 2003 Law Enforcement and Administrative Statistics
survey. 151 Setting out to determine whether equitable sharing is used to circumvent less
profitable state distribution laws, they implemented a cross-sectional research design to compare
the per capita amount of equitable sharing payments to each state with how restrictive their
forfeiture distributions laws are.

152

With no surprise, the results determined that law

enforcement agencies located in states where distribution laws were generous received
significantly lower equitable sharing payments. 153 In addition, they measured the equitable
sharing payments received by states in comparison with the standards of proof necessary to
forfeit property under applicable state law, 154 finding that law enforcement agencies located in
states with higher standards of proof receive larger equitable sharing payments. The direct
correlation between how profitable states’ distribution laws are, the degree of standards of proof,
and the amount of equitable sharing payments the agencies receives illustrates that state and local
law enforcement agencies follow the profit incentive and abuse the practice of equitable sharing
in order to reap the financial or evidentiary benefits.155
With full knowledge of the additional funds available, state and local law enforcement
agencies have “an enormous economic stake in federal forfeiture law” through the availability of
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a new source of income. 156 As more and more state and local law enforcement agencies proceed
via adoptive forfeitures, states are left powerless and unable to ensure that the agencies are
following the law of the state’s legislature. 157 This (optional) bypassing and circumvention of
the laws of the individual states, and subsequent transfer into federal jurisdiction should be
recognized and identified as violations of the fundamental principle of federalism. 158
Furthermore, the creation of the Justice Department’s Asset Forfeiture Fund has provided
federal law enforcement agencies with a similar profit incentive that their state and local
counterparts utilize through the practice of equitable sharing. 159 Since the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, the net proceeds of forfeitures are deposited into the Department of
Justice’s Asset Forfeiture Fund, and at the discretion of the Attorney General, are used to pay for
a wide array of law enforcement purposes including seizure and inventory expenses, payments
contract services, reimbursement to any Federal agency participating in t he Fund for
investigative costs, and law enforcement training. 160 The switch from the U.S. Treasury General
Fund to the Justice Department’s Asset Forfeiture Fund in 1984 enabled law enforcement
agencies to keep and retain all of the net forfeiture profits from their seizures. 161 The use of
Asset Forfeiture Fund has skyrocketed exponentially through forfeitures by federal agencies and
equitable sharing, particularly in the past two decades. 162 Starting in 1986, two years after its
creation, the fund received $93.7 million in deposits from currency and property forfeitures. 163
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In 2001, fifteen years later, $406.8 million was deposited into the fund. 164 In 2006, five short
years later, the fund received $1.125 billion in total deposits, and in 2008 the fund held o ver $1
billion in net assets for the first time ever. 165 This expansion spurned criticism and concern
regarding the lack of congressional accountab ility and the incentive for law enforcement
agencies to engage in profitable seizures.166
Scholars have appropriately criticized that the distribution of the Justice Department
Asset Forfeiture Fund violates the Appropriations Clause of the United States Constitution.167
Congress’s exclusive appropriations power, enumerated in Article I, sec. 9, cl. 7 of the United
States Constitution, requires a specific congressional appropriation before government income is
spent. 168 Currently, federal forfeiture revenue is deposited, maintained, and distributed through
the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture’s Fund, without any Congressional or Treasury
budgetary control. 169 This delegation of power to the Department of Justice is arguably
inherently unconstitutional, and has now given “law enforcement agencies the opportunity to set
the size of their own budgets through police seizures.”170 This troubling opportunity has further
resulted in a conflict of interest among law enforcement between policing legitimate law
enforcement goals and policing for profit. 171 Until the law enforcement agencies are held
accountable, and oversight is restored, the incentive to distort police agendas toward profitab le
seizures will remain. At minimum, the forfeited assets should be subjected to a budgetary
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release before they become available for use by the seizing law enforcement agency, a situation
that does not parallel the status quo.
Despite the enactment of CAFRA, the federal civil forfeiture system continues to allow
the law enforcement agencies to profit off asset forfeiture at the expense of property owners.
First, the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof implemented by CAFRA upon the
government is inadequate, and fails to combat the problem of uncontested forfeitures and protect
innocent owners.

In addition, CAFRA failed to address the most prominent concerns

surrounding civil forfeiture; the circumvention of state laws through federal equitable sharing
and adoptive forfeitures, federal law enforcement’s continuing incentive to engage in profitable
seizures, and the lack of accountability in the distribution of forfeited assets in the Justice
Department’s Asset Forfeiture Fund.172

Part IV: Proposed Legislation: The Fifth Amendment Integrity Restoration Act and Subsequent
Executive Policy Orders
A. The Fifth Amendment Integrity Restoration Act
On July 23, 2014, Senator Rand Paul introduced the Fifth Amendment Integrity
Restoration Act (“FAIR Act”). 173 The bill is designed to protect the rights of citizens and
reinforce the Fifth Amendment’s role in seizing property without due process of the law. 174 “The
FAIR Act will ensure that government agencies no longer profit from taking the property of U.S.
citizens without due process, while maintaining the ability of courts to order the surrender of
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proceeds of crime.”175 The FAIR Act contains three major changes to federal law; it would raise
the government’s standard of proof, eliminate the practice of federal equitable sharing, and
redirect the distribution of federal forfeiture assets from Justice Department’s Asset Fo rfeiture
Fund to the Treasury General Fund.176
First, section 2 of the FAIR Act would amend 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1), and require that the
government establish, by clear and convincing evidence that the property is subject to
forfeiture. 177 In addition, the FAIR Act amends section 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3), regarding
facilitating property, requiring the government to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
“(A) there was a substantial connection between the property and the offense; and (B) the owner
of any interest in the seized property- (i) intentionally used the property in connection with the
offense; or (ii) knowingly consented or was willfully blind to the use of the property by another
in connection with the offense.”178 Also, section 2 of the FAIR Act amends 18 U.S.C. § 983(d),
the innocent owner defense, by eliminating § 983(d)(2)(A)(i), “did not know of the conduct
giving rise to forfeiture” while leaving § 983(d)(2)(A)(ii) intact.
Section 3 of the FAIR Act amends 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1) by removing property forfeited
civilly from the Attorney General’s jurisdiction, as well as § 881(e)(2)(b) requiring the Attorney
General to forward forfeiture assets to the Treasurer of the U.S. for deposit in the General Fund
of the U.S. Treasury. 179 Additionally, section 3 of the FAIR Act amends 18 U.S.C. § 981(e),
eliminating the Attorney General’s authorization to retain or transfer the forfeited assets and in
turn requiring the forfeited assets to be deposited into the General Fund of the Treasury.
Furthermore, § 981(e)(7) is amended by removing the first two sentences, “The Attorney
175
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General… shall ensure the equitable transfer pursuant to paragraph (2) of any forfeited property
to the appropriate state or local law enforcement agency so as to reflect the contrib ution of any
such agency participating directly in any of the acts which led to the seizure and forfeiture of
such property.”180
Lastly, section 4 of the FAIR Act amends 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4) by striking
subparagraphs (A) and (B), 181 which provide for the deposit in the Asset Forfeiture Fund all
amounts of forfeited property by the Department of Justice

182

, as well as all amounts

representing the federal equitable share for any federal agency participating in the Asset
Forfeitures Fund.183
Simply put, the FAIR Act provides for three drastic changes to the current federal civil
forfeiture regime. First, the FAIR Act increases the government’s standard of proof in civil
forfeiture proceedings, requiring the government to prove the property’s forfeitability by clear
and convincing evidence.

184

This represents a significant increase from the current

preponderance of the evidence standard. The harder it is for the government to prove the
property’s forfeitability, the more protection property owners are afforded. Additionally, by
eliminating federal equitable sharing, the Act would require state and local law enforcement
agencies to abide by state laws when forfeiting seized property. 185 State and local enforcement
agencies will no longer be able to federalize or adopt forfeitures, and must proceed through their
own applicable state laws. So, state and local law enforcement agencies will no longer be able to
reap the financial or evidentiary benefits of federal law. Last, the Act redirects forfeited assets
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from the Justice Department’s Asset Forfeiture Fund to the U.S. Treasury General’s Fund,
disabling federal law enforcement agencies’ ability to receive the forfeited assets directly from
their seizures without accountability or budgetary constraint. 186 Redirecting forfeited assets to
the General Fund of the Treasury ensures congressional oversight of the distribution of such
funds.
B. Attorney General’s Executive Policy Order
During the process of writing this comment, on January 16, 2015, Attorney General Eric
Holder issued a policy order limiting a significant portion of the federal equitable sharing
program. 187 The order bans the federal adoption (i.e., adoptive forfeitures) of property seized by
state and local law enforcement under state la w, with one categorical exception for property
directly related to public safety concerns. 188 The public safety exception includes firearms,
ammunition, explosives, and property associated with child pornography.

189

Effective

immediately, vehicles, valuables, and cash are prohibited from federal adoption, requiring state
and local law enforcement to proceed pursuant to their respective state laws. 190
Attorney General Holder’s order banning adoptive forfeitures represents a significant
victory for individual property owners across the nation, as Equitable Sharing and federal
adoptions have been at the heart of forfeiture criticism for at least two decades. 191 But, one
important limitation to note is that this prohibition only extends to adoptive forfeitures, and does
not affect the other category of equitable sharing, joint investigations. Thus, state and local law
186
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enforcement agencies are still permitted to engage in the equitable sharing of seized assets
through joint investigations with federal authorities, joint task forces with federal authorities, or
through the issuance of federal seizure warrants.

Part V: Why Congress Should Enact the FAIR Act
The FAIR Act should be enacted by Congress because it appropriately equalizes the
burdens and standards of proof, removes law enforcement’s lingering profit incentive, and
ensures that appropriate state laws are not purposely evaded by state and local law enforcement
agencies.
A. The Clear and Convincing Standard of Proof
Currently, in civil forfeiture proceedings the government must establishby a
preponderance of the evidencethat the property is subject to forfeiture. 192 Recognizing that the
current allocation is inadequate, the FAIR Act increase s the government’s standard of proof to a
clear and convincing evidence standard. 193 The clear and convincing standard requires a higher
degree of certainty than a preponderance of the evidence, but less than the criminal standard of
beyond a reasonable doubt.194
Raising the standard of proof to a clear and convincing evidence standard aligns with the
true character of in rem civil forfeitures. 195 This middle-ground standard of proof appropriately
illustrates that the government alleging that a crime has taken place, a nd seeks to punish the
wrongdoing through the forfeiture of assets. Indeed, critics have argued that the punitive essence
of in rem civil forfeitures equates more with standard criminal proceedings than civil
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proceedings. 196 And this criticism is exactly on point. The Supreme Court has expressed a
similar description, concluding that forfeiture is “quasi-criminal in character. Its object, like a
criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against the law.” 197
Combined with the fact that the property owner’s guilt or innocence is irrelevant to the forfeiture
as it is filed in rem against the property itself, 198 this perceived notion of criminality does not
resonate with the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, and is an issue that must be
addressed by Congress.
Interestingly, the clear and convincing standard of proof was initially proposed in Rep.
Henry Hyde’s Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 1993. 199 Explaining why he choose clear
and convincing evidentiary standard of proof, he noted “there comes a point where civil penalties
are so overwhelmingly punitive in nature that a high burden of proo f should be assigned to the
government. 200 For example, the story of 72-year-old retired carpenter and cancer patient
Thomas Williams demonstrates the potentially devastating consequences associated with asset
forfeiture’s low burden of proof. 201

During one quiet November morning in 2013, the

Southwestern Enforcement Team, an agency operated by the Michigan State Police, raided Mr.
William’s home with a battering ram, black masks, and holding guns at their sides alleging that
Mr. Williams was a marijuana dealer. 202 Mr. William’s carries a medical marijuana card thereby
allowing him to cultivate up to 12 personal marijuana plants in his home. Instead of charging Mr.
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Williams with a crime, the police seized his Dodge Journey, $11,000 in cash, his television, his
cell phone, his shotgun, and are attempting to take his home. 203 As a result of the seizure, Mr.
Williams, a feeble and disabled 72-year-old man who lives alone without a landline, was
stranded for days without his cell phone or car until somebody stopped by to check on him. 204
Like many other stories involving innocent property owners, more than a year after the seizure,
Mr. William’s is still fighting to get his belongings back and retain possession of his house. 205
If the government is alleging that a crime has occurred and is punishing therewith, it is
extremely hard to justify the forfeiture based on a preponderance of the evidence, a
determination of whether the property is more likely than not forfeitable. The FAIR Act’s clear
and convincing evidence standard of proof appropriately illustrates and implements the ‘quasicriminal’ nature of civil in rem forfeitures, and requires the Government to produce evidence of
the property’s forfeitability that is substantially more likely than not true.
Additionally, the FAIR Act would provide innocent owners with practical protection. As
discussed in Part III, the application of the innocent owner’s defense results in an unleveled
allocation of the burdens of proof, with the government enjoying the favorable burden. The
FAIR Act addressed this concern in section 2 by requiring the government to produce clear and
convincing evidence of the “substantial connection between the property and the offense” as well
as the owner’s “intentional use,” “knowing consent,” or “willfully blind” use of the property in
connection with the offense. 206

The clear and convincing evidence standard bolsters the

procedural protections afforded to innocent property owners by initially requiring the
government to produce stronger evidence of the property’s forfeitability before the burden is
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shifted to the property owner. 207 Under the Act, in order to establish the innocent owners
defense, property owners will continue to bear the heavy burden of negating the government’s
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.

208

The heavy burden stems from the

requirement that individuals establish the innocence of their property through rebutting the
government’s allegations of guilt. But, before innocent property owners bear this burden, the
government must first prove the property’s forfeitability by clear and convincing evidence.
While proponents of the current civil forfeiture system may argue that raising the
government’s standard of proof will create an unbalanced evidentiary advantage favoring
property owners, 209 in reality it will properly align the allocation of the burdens and standards of
proof in all federal civil asset forfeiture proceedings. The practical feasibility of the clear and
convincing standard of proof is evidenced by the fact that thirteen states have already enacted
their own forfeiture laws implementing and adopting a clear and convincing evidence standard
upon the government. 210 Even though they are not in the majority, the fact that thirteen states211
have passed more stringent legislation than the federal government illustrates that the clear and
convincing evidence standard is both practically feasible and sustainable.

B. Elimination of the Profit Incentive
The FAIR Act removes federal law enforcement’s profit incentive and accountability
issues by redirecting forfeiture funds from the Justice Department’s Asset Forfeiture Fund to the
General Fund of the Treasury. As discussed in Part III, above, by depositing the funds into the
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General Fund of the Treasury, the Attorney General will no longer possess unbridled discretion
in the distribution of the forfeited assets, and congressional oversight and accountability will be
restored thereby alleviating the constitutional issue of the Appropriations Clause. 212
In addition to restoring accountability, directing funds to the General Fund of the
Treasury would eliminate the profit incentive inherent in the current regime. 213 Currently,
federal forfeiture proceeds are deposited into the Justice Department’s Asset Forfeiture Fund and
allocated to the seizing agency by the Attorney General to be used for law enforcement purposes
only. 214 By redirecting the forfeited assets into the General Treasury Fund, the FAIR Act
ensures that the funds will be appropriated based on areas and departments of need. 215 This
method of distribution aligns with the duties and functions of the Department of the Treasury, as
the Treasury is responsible for “operating and maintaining systems that are critical to the nation’s
financial infrastructure” including revenue collection. 216 Furthermore, depositing forfeiture
proceeds in the General Fund of the Treasury disables law enforcement agencies from retaining
all of the assets that they seize, and such agencies would no longer possess the ability to directly
fund themselves through forfeitures. 217 Thus, the FAIR Act eliminates law enforcement’s profit
incentive because the General Fund of the Treasury will not distribute all of the forfeited assets
back to the seizing agency for law enforcement uses only, as the current Asset Forfeiture Fund
permits. In theory, this would eliminate any conflict of interest upon law enforcement to stray
their attention from actual crime prevention goals and objectives.218
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C. Ending the Federal Equitable Sharing Program
The FAIR Act ensures that individual state’s laws will not be circumvented or evaded by
eliminating the practice of federal equitable sharing. Through the elimination of the equitable
sharing, the FAIR Act disallows state and local law enforcement agencies to forum shop their
seizures, through adoptive forfeitures, in order to maximize revenue or evidentiary benefits,
thereby comporting with the fundamental principle of federalism.
The current practice of equitable sharing by state and local law enforcement agencies
infringes upon the fundamental constitutional principle of federalism. 219 Federalism involves the
concept of “dual sovereignty”, providing for a balance of power between the federal government
and individual states, as certain powers are constitutionally enumerated to the federal
government and all other powers belonging to the sovereign states. 220

This principle is

embedded throughout the Constitution, including: the Judicial Power Clause (Art. III, sec. 2), the
Privileges and Immunities Clause (Art. IV, sec. 2), the Guarantee Clause (Art. IV, sec. 4), the
amendment provision (Art. V), and the enumerated powers of Congress (Art I., sec. 8). 221 The
idea of state sovereignty is illustrated in the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
providing “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.” 222 Thus, dual sovereignty
involves the independent and concurrent authority and jurisdiction over the people between
federal and state governments. 223 This concept does not provide for complete independence, as
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Congress retains certain authority to regulate state activity, i.e., through the Commerce Clause.224
But, Congressional authority to regulate state activity comes with limitations. As set forth in
Printz v. United States, “The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the
States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program... such commands are
fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty. ”225 In simpler
terms, the federal government cannot force state governments to cooperate with federal
regulatory programs against their will.
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that federal law “shall
be the supreme law of the land”, notwithstanding the contrary law any state might have. 226 The
clause establishes federal precedence over states’ laws and constitutions. Simply put, federal
laws trump or preempt any conflicting state law, thereby establishing this ground floor that
invalidates state law in conflict. The Supreme Court has posited that the constitutional principle
still allows states to have discretion in the creation, adoption, and enforcement of their respective
laws, particularly in when Congress has “legislated… in a field which the States have
traditionally occupied.”227 The Court further held that “the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.”228 The argument can be made that the federal equitable sharing program conflicts
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with this fundamental constitutional principle, as Congress “clear and manifest purpose” was not
to remove the police powers of the States. 229
As discussed in Part III, above, when state and local law enforcement agencies proceed
through federal equitable sharing via adoptive forfeitures, the seized assets are transferred to a
federal agency for federal proceedings, liquidated, and then distributed back to the state or local
seizing agency for the purpose of law enforcement use only, completely disregarding the state’s
law pertaining to standard of proof and the distribution of forfeited assets. 230 This violates the
fundamental principles of federalism and state sovereignty because states are powerless with no
choice in the matter but to comply with the equitable sharing and adoptive forfeitures. 231 The
current situation is completely at odds with the concept of state sovereignty, “the preservation of
states as independent and autonomous political entities”, 232 because states are unable to enforce
their own laws pertaining to the distribution of forfeited assets and the standard of proof
necessary to establish the property’s forfeitability.

Instead of requiring state and local law

enforcement agencies to abide by state mandated legislation, the federal equitable sharing
program and the existence of adoptive forfeitures provides an avenue for state and local law
enforcement agencies to circumvent the applicable state law in order to reap the distribution and
evidentiary benefits available through federal asset forfeiture law. Upon adoption of the seizure
by a federal agency, the forfeiture proceedings commence under federal law and jurisdiction,
leaving the state powerless to adjudicate the proceeding under their legislation. The lack of
choice on the part of states does not resonate with the concurrent and independent authority
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under dual sovereignty, and practice of federal equitable sharing and adoptive forfeitures should
be recognized as an unconstitutional command enforcing a federal regulatory program. 233
Through the elimination of the equitable sharing, the FAIR Act disables state and local
law enforcement agencies from circumventing appropriate state law in order to maximize
revenue or evidentiary benefits. The abuse of the equitable sharing program should be
recognized as nothing less than infringing upon the fundamental principle of federalism and must
be abolished.

Part VI: Conclusion
The time has come to reform federal civil forfeiture law. CAFRA provided the first
reform of the civil forfeitures laws, but left several glaring inequities. Currently, the federal
government enjoys too low of an evidentiary standard of proof, triggering due process concerns,
and restricting the practical application of the innocent owner defense. The preponderance of the
evidence standard currently utilized in civil in rem forfeitures can no longer be justified and does
not align or resonate with the true character of such proceedings, as individual property owners
are deprived of their property without compensation because the government has alleged that a
crime has taken place, and does not align with the true character of such proceedings. Senator
Paul’s FAIR Act requires the government to prove the property’s forfeitability by a clear and
convincing evidence standard, a necessary step in the protection of individual’s fundamental
property rights.
In addition, the practice of federal equitable sharing provides state and local law
enforcement agencies with the opportunity to circumvent state law and proceed under federal
jurisdiction in order to benefit from favorable advantages, whether that is an easier evidentiary
233
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standard of proof or the ability to receive back a larger percentage of the forfeiture funds through
distribution. The FAIR Act alleviates this problem by eliminating the equitable sharing program
and requiring state and local law enforcement agencies to abide by their own state law. Attorney
General Holder’s recent ban of adoptive forfeitures provides the FAIR Act with a foundation to
its implementation, but it is only the first step toward correcting the abuses of civil asset
forfeiture.
Last, the ability to directly retain forfeited assets provides law enforcement agencies with
an unjust profit incentive.

The lack of congressional budgetary accountability further

exacerbates this problem, as the Attorney General retains vast authority and discretion over the
use and distribution of the current Justice Department’s Asset Forfeiture Fund. The FAIR Act
removes this concerning profit incentive by redirecting the forfeited assets from the Justice
Department Asset Forfeiture Fund to the General Fund of the Treasury. By depositing the funds
in the General Fund of the Treasury, the Attorney General will no longer possess the authority to
distribute the forfeited assets directly back to the seizing agency via the Asset Forfeiture Fund,
and federal law enforcement agency’s incentive to engage in profitable civil forfeitures is
effectively eliminated.
Despite addressing several prominent areas of civil asset forfeiture abuse, the FAIR act
fails to eliminate all of the concerning systematic inequities present in the current civil asset
forfeiture regime.

Nearly eighty percent of all forfeitures in federal court proceed

uncontested. 234 While the FAIR Act addresses the back-end of this problem by raising the
standard of proof necessary to establish a property’s forfeitability in an in rem judicial
proceeding, the Act fails to rectify the standard of proof necessary to permit the initia l seizure of
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the individual’s property; leaving property owners in a financial plight as they are forced to
expend considerable amount of money on legal fees in order to contest the forfeiture in a judicial
proceeding.
Thus, enacting the FAIR Act will finish the job CAFRA left undone. In order to provide
an adequate level of protection to individuals’ property rights, the status quo cannot be
maintained. If enacted, the FAIR Act will not only provide the appropriate protection to the
citizens of this great nation, but also restore the fundamental constitutional principle of
federalism that has been embedded in our society since its creation.
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